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INCOMING TELEGRAM Department of State

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INDICATIONS FOR PERIOD JULY 13-AUGUST 24.

1. THERE ARE NO INDICATIONS OF GRC PREPARATIONS FOR ANY SIGNIFICANT BACK-TO-THE-MAINLAND ACTIVITY. WE BELIEVE GRC REMAINS UNWILLING TO CONDUCT ANY MAJOR UNILATERAL ACTION AGAINST MAINLAND WITHOUT PRIOR ASSURANCE US SUPPORT. GRC EFFORTS TO ENLIST SUCH SUPPORT ARE LIKELY TO INCREASE.

2. THE AUGUST 6 GRC-CHICOM NAVAL CLASH, IN WHICH TWO GRC SHIPS LOST, WAS MAJOR DEFEAT FOR CHINAT NAVY, BUT DID NOT SIGNAL ANY CHANGE IN GRC POLICY OF AVOIDING SUCH BATTLES WITH CHICOMS. COMMANDER GRC NAVY RELIEVED FOLLOWING THIS DEFEAT. NOT CERTAIN THAT PURPOSE OF OPERATION SOLELY ABDUCTION/PENETRATION RAID DESCRIBED BY MOST SOURCES, BUT CLEARLY ITS OBJECTIVE WAS LIMITED. HIGHLY UNLIKELY OPERATION WAS DELIBERATE GRC ATTEMPT TO PROVOKE INCIDENT IN STRAITS.

3. AIR ACTIVITY IN STRAITS AUGUST 17 AFTER LOSS OF GRC PATROL AIRCRAFT WAS MINOR INCIDENT WITH NO INDICATIONS SIGNIFICANCE. CHICOM AIRCRAFT REACTED TO CHINAT RESCUE EFFORTS, BUT WHEN CHINAT FIGHTERS ESTABLISHED AIR COVER BOTH SIDES AVOIDED CLASH.

4. GRC-SOUTH VIETNAMESE MILITARY DISCUSSIONS DURING VISIT OF PREMIER KY TO TAIWAN APPARENTLY CONFINED TO GENERALITIES. PREMIER KY SAID IN SAIGON AUGUST 22 THAT GRC WOULD BE PLEASED TO SEND COMBAT FORCES TO SOUTH VIET-NAM IF REQUESTED.

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